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Bargaining versus Price Competition in Markets
with Quality Uncertainty
fIr flr.l.ti)uT Besrrti~
7-his paper fixuscs trn thc cndugcr.uus
dctcrmination of trading rulcs. In muny
markets, as for cxample in lhe retail husi-
ness, prices are simply posted by scllcrs, and
the buyer has little direct in(luence on how
much he has to pay. In other markets prices
arc the outcomc of hilatcral ncgotiations, so
that both thc scller and thc buyer takc an
active part in setting the price. Examples
includc not only the bazaar of a less dcvel-
oped nation, bul also the markets for used
cars, real estate, antiques, and ínputs for
manufacturing firms. This papcr providcs a
theoretical explanation of which pricing in-
stitution is likely to emerge in a markct
where buyers are imperfectly informed
about the quality of goods ur services. 1
compare the performance characteristics of
postcd-offer pricing with negotiated pricing
and find that each arrangement has specific
merits. ~'hese determine the equilibrium
pricing policy as the outcome of compctilive
interactions between the market partici-
pants.
The kcy insight of my analysis is that the
price-determination aspects of market orga-
nization can also afíect yuality. Suppose the
buyer has to visit a firm to determine its
choice of product quality and that hc cxpc-
riences switching costs when moving from
une seller to anothcr. The incentive to pro-
vidc quality in the posted-price regimc is
that the consumer may walk away to an-
other store if the quality is too low. Switch-
ing COSIS may Undermine IhÍS incentive be-
cause they creatc a lock-in eficct. A scller
whu has a locked-in customer may rcduce
his cost by choosing a lower quality. This
'Center (or Ecorwmic Rexearch. Tilburg Universily.
P.O. 13ux Q0153, 5(xx) LE Tilburg. The Netherlands. I
thank Dilip Monkherite, Larry Samuekon, Jonalhan
Thc~ma~. Gric van Uamme. and lw~i referees (or thcir
comments
argumcnt is oftcn uscd tu adwK:tlc sclf-
cnfurccd hans tin pricc advcrtising for
providers of pro(cssional scrviccs such as
docton and lawyers.' While posted-pricing
promotes er crnre price competition, it may
Icad to a dctcrioration in product quality.
ln contrast with posted pricing, bargain-
ing determines the price of the good ajtrr
thc buycr has arrived at a storc and learned
its qualily. Hcre lhc incen[ive lo provide
yuality is gencratcd by lhc fact that thc
scllcr gcts some fraction of the total sur-
plus. He will seck to maximize Ihis surplus
by selectíng the scxially cfficicnt quality. As
a result, thc ncgotiatcd-pricc markct ducs
not exhibit the moral-hazard problem that
characterizes the posted-price market.
However, the locked-in consumer tinds him-
sclf in a situation of partial hilateral
monopoly with the scller. This allows the
seller to exploit his customer, and the har-
gaining may result in a relatively high price.
The different impact of switching costs on
price and quality in the posted- and the
ncgotiated-price markets determincs the
competítivencss of these trading rules.2
"f-hcre is a considerable literature study-
ing the formation of prices in decentralized
markcts where peirs of agents bargain over
thc gains from trade.' 'fhis literature takes
~Yuk-Shec Chan anJ Hayne Leland (19N2) and
William Rogeruro (198R) ezamine thi~ argumenl.
' For a comparison o( pnsred and nego[iated pricing
in a IaMtratory experiment, sec James Hong and
Charles Plnlt 1198?).
~This includes work hy Peter Diamond and Eric
M;ukin f1Q7y1. Ariel Ruhinstein and Asher Wolinskv
( 1985), Unuglas Gale (14K6a.b). and myself (19HR). A
dilTerent cunlexl ic considered in my 19ti9 paper. wbere
I replace rhe price-sening stage o! the standard spalial
eompetilinn modcl with a F:vgaining gamc. Furthcr
references and a aetailed discussion of bargaining in e
markel setting are (ound in the moaograpb by Martin
Osborne and Ruhinstein (I~Nq.
17R
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lhc Irading rulc as exogcnously givcn; thc
sellers arc prohibited from competing with
each other hy pusting prices. -I~he uptimal
sclling sUategy vf a monopvlistic scllcr is
studicd hy John Riley and Richard Zcck-
hauscr (19R3) and hy Drcw fudcnbcrg cl al.
l 1987). 'I~hcir analysis is cunccrncd with thc
yucstion of whether a fixcd postcd pricc
yiclds a higher payofi for the seller than a
haggling strategy. Bcginning with thc work
of William Vickrey (19(iU, the choice of
sclling mechanisms is an important topic
alsv in the auction literature.' It turns out
that posting a fixed price is the optimal
strategy for a monopolistic seller of a single
good when he faces a single potential buyer.
Similarly, with many buyers, posted pricing
is optimal for the monopvlist when he pro-
duccs the good tmdcr constant rcturns to
scalc and can freely vary thc amount olfered
for salc (see Millon Harris and Arthur F2a-
viv, 1981a,b). Paul Milgrom (19R7) cmbcds
the auction model in a noncooperative-
bargaining modcl in which thc owner of thc
good always has the right tv resell thc itcm
lo other traders. He finds that conducting
an auction allows a weak bargainer to benc-
fit from Ihe presence of stronger bargainers,
sv that typically the sale will be by auction
rather than by priva[e olfer. Thc following
features distinguish my model (rom this lit-
cralure: there are many producers operat-
ing uncler constant rcturm to scalc; thcsc
producers can compc[c hy advcrtising priccs;
huyers are imperlectly infonned about
pruduc[ yuality: and buycrs facc switching
costs and cannot negotiate with several sell-
crs at the same time.
To address the problcm, 1 study a simplc
model that allows one to derive an eyuilib-
rium solution both for negotiated and posted
pricing. It is presented in Section l. Sections
11 and 111 investigate the equilibrium out-
comc undcr both trading rules. Bascd on
this analysis, I endogenizc the determina-
tion vf tracling rulcs in Scction IV, whcrc I
'Stc I'nston McAfcc and John McMillaa (1987)
and Paul Milgrum t 1987) for a sun~iy.
show that Cor each parame[er constcllation
there is a unique equilibrium pricing mech-
anism. Concluding remarks are contained in
Scction V.
1. The M11oJcl
Considcr a markct with N 1 2 identical
firms. Each firm produces a singlc gcxid at
conslant rcturns to scale. Before the markct
opens, each firm decides once-and-for-all
on lhe quality q e(qt„ q~) of its oulput,
where qt, ~ 4~. The cost vf producing one
unil of quality q is c(q) with c(qh) ~ c(q~).
In the model all consumers arc identical.
~~hey do not interact slrategically with each
other. This together with thc assumption of
conslant returns to scale allows one to con-
sidcr each buyer in isolation independenlly
of thc total number of consumcrs. Each
consumer purchases at most one unit of the
good. His utility from purchasing quality q
at the price p is given hy q- p. Alterna-
tively, hc may not purchase the good frum
any of Ihe N firms and rnnsume some 'but-
side good'" instcad. The price and the qual-
ity uf the outside gvod are exogenously fixed
so that the consumer enjvys the net bencfit
r frvm buying it.
The buycr docs not directly observe lhc
firms' choice of yuality. He Icarns the qual-
ity q sold at a parlicular storc only by visit-
ing Ihc storc. Thcrc is a cosl lo visiting a
storc. Switching from onc of thc N scllcrs
to anothcr or to consuming the outside gvod
takes one time unit. As the buycr discounls
(uturc bcncfits by the discount faclor 11 ~
S c I, this creates a swilching cosL We will
view S as a mcasurc of thcsc costs and
investigate its impact on the formation of
prices in this market. This is dvnc undcr thc
fullowing assumplion:
Íl) 9h-c(qn)~r'~q~-c~qe)~0.
Thus, in the full-information cyuilihrium
with pcrfect competition all firms would
producc quality qt,, and lhe consumcr would
buy thc high-yuality gcxid at lhc price p-
c(qt,). Consuming thc vutsidc good would
yicld a lowcr utility Icvel. In addition, lhe
2xn rnr: ,t,~fran~a.v I;cuNn,tllc arvtrn~ et~tac )I I9vt
surplus from producing thc luw-yuality goocl
is takcn to bc too low tu competc with the
uutsidc gcxtd. This implics th:u undcr im-
pcrfcct informatiun lhc htrycr will ncvcr visit
a storc that hc suspccls to olier yualiry q,..
Accordingly. 1 can con(inc thc analysis tu
situatiuns whcrc thc srllcrs lind cluxning
yuatity qt, to he uptimal.
It. The Ncgotiated-t'rice hlarket
In the negotiated-price market the con-
sumer has the option of purchasing the out-
side good or visiting one of the N stures tu
bargain aboui the pricc uf [he goud. Upon
entering a sture, he observes the quality q
actually chosen by the seller and su the
price negotiations proceed under symmelric
information. The "disagrecmcnt puint" in
this bilatcral bargaining siluatiun represcnts
the payofís of the buyer and thc seller.
respectivcly, if no sale lakes place and thc
buyer quils; it will he dcnoted :ts (d.(I). Of
cuursc, the buyer's payolf d depcnds upun
his switching cost and lhe net henefit that
he expects from hargaining with anolher
scllcr or simply frum cunsuming thc outsidc
goud. Accordingly, in cquilihrium, d will be
dctermined cndogenously. The seller's profit
trom nat making a sale is zero. He kceps a
constant inventory of the good so that after
each sale he incurs the cost c(q) of produc-
ing one unit. Suppose the gcneralizcd Nash
bargaining solution is the outcome of the




`Tbe generalized Nash solution is studied by John
Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (197Z). An axiomatiza-
tion of this solution is given by fhud Kalai (1977) and
Alvin Roth U9791. Kenneth Hinmore et al. lI9R(,)
derive the generalized Nash bargaining sotution as the
nonccxiperative equilihrium nf an extensive game in
which the parties alternate in making o(Ters and rnun-
teroffers.
"Of courxe. an agrecment will hc reachcJ unly if lhe
surplus q-r~q)-d i~ nonncgutivc Tbi. cundition is
always fulfilled in the eyuitibrium delined bclow.
with ll G a C I. This solution splits lhc sur-
plus su that thc huycr reccivcs thc fraction
rr. 'I"he paramcter cr may thereforc he inter-
prclcd as cxpressing lhc huycr's " h:ug:tining
puwcr"; by varying a from zero tu unity.
une can ohtain any pricc that is irtdiviclually
raliunal hulh litr thc huycr and thc sdlcr.
Much of my :utalysis will focus vn thc juint
impact uf thc hargaining paramclcr rr and
Ihc fric;tion paramctcr fi on lhc markct out-
comc.
In thc event of breakdown in thc ncgutia-
tions, the huyer can either switch to anolher
bargaining partner or he can purchase the
outsidc guud. As the surplus q~ - c(q~ ) is
less than t~, the huyer will not go tu one of
the N stores unless he is cunvinced that he
will tind quality qh.~ In thc cyuilibrium ol
thc negotiatcd-price markct the buycr cx-
pccls high qualily, and hc anlicipatcs lhal
thc hargaining will result in sumc pricc p.
Given these expectations and the delay cost
uf switching, his cxpcctcd ulitity frum dis-
:tgrcemcnt is
(3) cl( P) -max[fit.. rs(q~,- n)1.
tn cquilibrium thc consumcr's pricc-qualily
expectations have to be consistent with the
market outcome.
Ucfirritiurt: (~ is a rrc~olirrtcd-pricc cquilih-
riton if (i) 9j, - p~ t~ and ~i ? c(yt, ): (ii)
1r - W(qt,. rl ) and cf - d( p); and (iii) j~ -..c(c;i~)- ~..ar.rri- ctqr r.
The first of these conditions ensures that
both the sellers and the buyers are willing
to participate in thc markct. If (i) fails to
hold, then nune of the N sellers is activc,
and the consumcr purchascs thc outsidc
good. By ( ii), the equilihrium price p is
determined by the bargaining sulution, tak-
ing inlo account that the buyer's threat puint
~As will be shown Fxluw, ch~~sing qi, is a Jominanl
slr.dcEy fur each seller. This precludes thc rxrssibilily
~if a mixcd equilihrium ín which vimc sctlcrs ehixisc q~,
and ulhen ch~wtie q,.





Picuae I. Nrt(a~nnren Pe~('wc Is nN
Fo(~n uu(n~~i iN RrowNS II ,~NU IV: P(i~rnu
Puu mc Is nN Gotm.~nHn~~i rv Rr(:I(~Nti 1 nNU 1!
in the price negotiation is d( ~i). Finally, liii)
guarantces that each single seller finds il in
his own interest to select yuality y~,. In
equilihrium, the buyer is inditferent amung
all stores so that the sellers share thc mar-
kct cyually. ~1-o state thc main result of this
scction, 1 define the function
r - a~qn - c(9n)~
(4) Sn(a)- (l-a)r'
Liy assumption ( I), fi~( ~) is decreasing,
S~((l)- l. -cnd S,~(a)? O for all a 5 r~
(qi, - c(q~,)]. In Figure I the tunction S-
S~(a) reprcsents thc borderline betwcen thc
hvo rcgions I f 11I and tI f tV.
PROPOSITION I: There is a negnliaied-
price equifibr'iunt if and only if s~ r~(a). If





~~hc gcncraiízcd Nash bargaining solution




W(q.d)-c(q) -( I -a)~q-c(q)-d]
so that by assumption (U equilibrium condi-
tion (iii) is satisfied for any p satisfying
conditian (ii). By the first inequality of con-
dition (i), one must have d( ji) - S(qn - p).
Therefore, solving (ii) for p yields the
uniyue solution stated in thc proposition.
"I'his solution always satisfics thc second in-
eyuality in (i); the first incquality in (i) is
idcntical to a(q~, - cn]~[I -(1 - a)S]? r. By
the definition of S~, this is eyuivatent to
fi ~ S~(a).
1'he inequality S? S~(a) is satistied in
regions 11 and IV of Figure L For these
parameter constellations, Ihe consumer pur-
chases the high-quality good at the price p.
As ~~ exceeds c(qn), the presence of market
frictions enables the sellers to earn positive
profits. These are higher, the lower are S
and a. lnterestingly, p approaches c(qn)
both in the limit when S-~ I and in the
limit when a-~ 1. 1'he first of these proper-
ties justifics viewing the perfectly competi-
tivc outcomc as the limiting point of a mar-
ket with negligihle switching costs.
Why docs the consumer purchase the
oulsidc guod for valucs of S and a in re-
gions I and III, where a ncgotiated-price
equilibrium fails to exist? The reason is that
these parameter values violate equilibrium
condition (i). With high switching costs and
litlle bargaining power the buyer cannot get
a favorahle deal once he has entered a
store. Knowing this es anre keeps him from
going to a store and induces him to con-
sume the outside good. This kind of market
failure is well known from the standard
search model (see e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, 1979)
in which prices are unilaterally set by sell-
ers, and buycrs have to visit stores to oh-
scrve priccs. lndccd, in lhc limiting situa-
tion whcre a- 0 the negotiated-price
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markcl becomcs idcntical to the simplest 111. "fhe Pnsted-Price Market
scarch modcl with iclcntical huycrs and scll~
crs. When a- 0 thc seller has all the
bargaining powcr and ctfcctivcly makcs a
take-it-or-leave-it ulfer lo his customers.
Proposition I shows that in this case j~ - qri
li.c., cach scller would charge the con-
sumer's rescrvalion price). ~~his observation
is thc wcll-known "monopoly pricc paradox"
of Diamond (1971): cvcn with arbitrarily
small scarch costs and a large numbcr of
firms, in market eyuilibrium the price is the
monopoly price. If the buyer has to pay a
cost for entering the market or can opt for
some outside good, this paradox predicts
total market failure." In regions 1l and IV
this unsatisfactory outcome is avoided be-
cause cr is large enough to guarantee the
buyer a sutlicient share of the gains from
[rade.
lmportantly, the proof of Propositíon 1
reveals that the negotiated-príce market in-
volves no prohlem of mor.tl hazard; that is,
the incentive constrainl (iii) is never bind-
ing. This perhaps surprising obscrvation has
a simple intuition: the bargaining outcome
guarantees the scller a fraction ( I- cr) of
the hargaining surplus. As a result, he is
always better off by producing qh because
this quality yields a higher surplus than does
q~. Chcxising quality qh is a dominant strat-
egy for the seller in the negotiated-price
market.y This fact distinguishes this market
from the posled-price market, which 1 turn
to in the next section, where prices are set
hejore the consumer becumes aware of qual-
ities.tl'
"In the Iiteraturc, the typical way to avoid the
Uiamund result has been to assume that snme con-
sumers are well informed alxiut prices (see Steven
Selop and Stigliti, 1977; ftal Varian, 19K0; Uale Stahl,
19ri9).
vThis conclucion is robust against altine transfnrma-
tinns of the sellcr's and buycr's utilities. The reason is
that the generalixd Nash bargaining solution satisfies
the axiom of independence of utility rescalings.
tnThc relati~mship betwecn cr ruur and er lxisr
pricing in a mrxlcl without qualilativc unccrtaíniy is
explored by Gadc U9a}t1.
In Ihe posted-price market, the scllers act
as Bcrtrand compctilors by posting prices.
Advcrtising price information enables the
scllcr to guarantec his custumers a price
before they visit his store. In contrast we
assume that communication of quality infor-
matiun is infcasihlc. 'I~his assumption is rcl-
evant in markets where yuality is cithcr tcxt
costly lo communicatc or is not veriliablc to
third parties. If a court finds it hard to
determine whether a seller actually provides
"high" quality, then buyers must distrust
quality advertisements because they cannot
bc enforced.
The buyer obscrves the sellers' price quo-
tations and compares their attractiveness
with the outside-option utility r. After en-
tering a store and learning its quality he can
either make a purchase at the posted price
or switch to another seller. By assumption
( I), he will not go to a store if he anticipates
finding quality q~.'t ln the posted-price
equilibrium the buyer expects qh in each
store, and so all sellers post the same price
p'. As all stores appear identical to the
buyer, he visits one of them at random. To
confirm his expectations, competition must
induce the suppliers to offer quality qh.12 As
q is not directly observable, each single seller
has an incentive to select qh at the posted
price n` only if the buyer would quit after
observing quality q~. Given his expcctations
about qualities at other stores, the buyer
will ccrtainly do so if q~ - p' ~ d( p~ ). In
fact, we will assume that the buyer refuses
to purchase low quality unless he is not
actually worse ofTby departing.t' This means
'~Of course. the buyer presumes thal no scller of-
fers the gond al a price below ccnt.
til assume that each seller selects yh when he is
indilfcrent belween q~, and q~.
t'This tie-breaking nde is necessary to avoid the
open-set problem diat would occur if there were no
lowest pricc that signals high yuality. Indecd, equilib-
rium cunditiun (iiil in the next (txisteJ-price equilib-
rium) definitiun is impossiblc to sertisfy if condition (ii)
is repL~ced hy p' ] irt ps )
l'Ol.. 8.7 N'O. 1 (iliSTfR: IIARG~UNINC~ tTR.SU.S
PRfCL COMPf:TITION 2R3
that each single seller will choose quality q~,
if and only if the equilibrium price p' satis-
tics the restriction p' ? rr( p' ), where
(6) ~(p')-qr-d(p`).
Whilc p~` ?~rr(Ir`) cnsures thc provisiun
of high quality, a key factor in the determi-
nation of p` is that priccs arc a signal oF
quality. Should sonic scllcr dcvíatc from p"
by posting p G p`, then the buyers will use
the obscrved price to draw inferences about
this scllcr's quality. If they interprct p as a
signal of quality qr, thcy will not be a[-
tracted even though p ~ p'. The opposite
happens if p is regarded as a signal of
quality q,,. As in other signaling games. such
an indeterminacy of out-of-eyuilibrium be-
liefs may lead to a multiplicity of equilib-
rium prices p~`. To avoid this prohlcm, 1 will
restrict the buycrs' bcliefs tu satisfy the "in-
tuitivc criterion" proposcd by ln-Koo Cho
and Uavid Krcps ( 19R7). Supposc some
sellcr wants to undercut his competitors by
some price p slightly bclow p' and, at the
same time, wishes to convince the consumer
[hat he ofters high quality. Then one may
reasonably assume that this selVer succeeds
if he would not gain by posting p and
sclecting quality qr, even if his otfer attracts
the entire market. This prerequisite is ful-
lillcd if low quality dcters the customer from
paying p for thc good, that is, if p? rr( p' ).
Summing up. in the posted-price equilib-
rium p~ only prices p? rr( P~` ) arc consid-
crcd as a signal of high quali[y.
Ucfrrritiorl: p` is a po.ucd-price cquilibrium
if (i) yh - p~ ~ r~ and p` ? c(qh); ( ii) p` ?
rr( p~` ) ; and ( iii) there is no p?~r( p~`) such
that p c p~ and p- c(qh) ~[ p' -
c(qh)I~N.
The first of these conditions is the same
as in the definition of the negotiated-price
equilihrium. Requirement ( ii) represents the
sellcrs' inccntive-compatihility constraint to
provide high quality. Condition ( iii) pre-
cludes any of the sellers gaining by unilater-
ally posting sume price p below ps that
signals high quality. Here we assume that if
all sellers post the same price p`, each
sture has the same chance of atlracting con-
sumers so that its market share equals l ~N.
The equilibrium outcome depends on the
level of switching costs. Let
(7) Su-l-(qn-9e)rl'-
'l~hcn, SI, c I bccausc qh ~ qr.
PROPOSITION 2: 7llere is a posted-price
equilihriuni if aud ouly if S? Se. IJ S ~ Sn,
the postednrice equilibrilun is latique with
p' - ma~c[c(qh),(qr - Sqn)~(1- S)].
PROOF:
By the first inequality in equilibrium con-
dition (i), one has -rr( p`) - 9r - S(qn - p~ )~
As p~` ? c(qh) and N? 2, condition (iii) is
satistied if and only if p` minimizes p sub-
jcct to p Z c(qh) and p z~r( p` )- For S?
[4t - c(q~,)]~[qh - c(qh)j, only the first con-
straint is binding and so one has p' - c(qh).
Otherwise, only the second constraint is
binding so that p~ - rr( p` ), that is, p~` -
(qr - Sqh)~( l- S). lf p` - c(qn), the firsl
inequality in (i) is always satisfied. For p~ ~
c(yh) this inequality becomes qh - p' -
(qh - qr)~(1 - S)? u which, by definition of
fiu, is identical to S 2 Se.
1'he posted-price equilibrium may fail to
exist for low values of S if Sri 1 0, that is, if
(8)
qh-qlGU.
This condition implies that the consumer
prefers buying the outside good to purchas-
ing quality qh at a price p~ qr. It limits thc
use of prices as signals of quality in the
posted-price market. Even though the buyer
may reasonably be convinced that prices
above qr indicate high quality, because he
would always quit a low-quality store with
p~ qr, he cannot be attracted by such a
price offer. More generally, the lock-in
e(fect becomes more serious when the dif-
ference between qh and qr is decreased.
This is so because the consumer's utility
gain from quitting a low-quality seller and
ZRJ ritt:,t,tll:Itl['-1N li('ONUM1t!(' ItFI'llai' M1LIR(71 l~rl?
going to a high-qualily seller becomes
smaller.t~
Regions 1 and 11 of Figurc I dcxribc thc
area where a posted-price equilibrium cx-
ists. For values of S hclow fit; thc lock-in
elíect hecomes too strong and Icacts tu :t
dctcrioration of prucluct quality. As a con-
sequencc, thc inslitutiun uf puslcd-olirr
pricing prccludcs thc scllcrs from hcing ac-
live in the markcl and resuh~ in consun?p-
tion of the outside g(xrd in rcgions lll
and IV.
For S close enough to unity, thc posted
price p~ equals c(qh). For lower values of
S, however, one observes that price exceeds
marginal costs. ~~he inerease in the pricc
above the cost of producing high quality
gives the firms an incentive not to otíer low
quality. This is a familiar fcaturc of scarch
modcls in which priccs signal procluct qual-
ity (see Ashcr Wulinsky, I9R3; Rogcrson,
1988). A similar mechanism appcars :llso in
expcricncc gtxrd tnarkcts with rcpcal ptn-
chases, in which quality is Icarned after thc
goud is bought. In thc Bcnjamin Klein and
Kcith B. L,eHler (19HU model, consumers
pay a quality premium which prcvcnts the
sellcr from culting quality. Michael Riordan
(I9R6) assumes that firms make price and
quality decisions which cannot be altered
over the relevant period. A high price then
signals a high quality since consumers would
refuse a .cecond purchase of low quality at a
high price. In my model, the consumer
learns about quality before buying the good
and so he necer purchases luw quality at a
high price.
The negotiated-price market is clcarly
more efiicient than the posted-price regime
in region IV of Figure I. Here the N firms
remain inactive in the posted-price market,
whereas negotiated pricing results in pro-
duction of the high-quality good with posi-
tive payofís both for the sellers and thc
buyers. In contrast, the posted-price market
~aThe same argument shows lhat the eyuilihrium
quality musl unravel lo q; whcn yu:dily is a arntinuouc
ehoice variable within some intcrval Iq~.~h,L T,t aw,id
lotal market taiture in this situalion, unc has lo asume
lhat some consumers are well infonned ahout quality.
appears to be supcrior in rcgiun I, whcrc
thc huycr rcfrains from enlcring ncgotia-
tiuns hccausc his hargaining puwer is too
luw. "I hc kcy insight from Nropusitions I
and 2 is tha[ thc Iwo categorics uf trading
inslitutions involve a tradc-u(f. I'ricc har-
gaining avoids thc mural-hazard prohlcm in
thc lirms' sclcction uf qualitics; yct, as lhc
pricc is dclcrmincd er pn.~r aflcr thc huycr
h:lv choscn lhc scllcr, il may nut guaranlcc
lhc huycr a sullicicnt fraclion of thc surplus
tu make bargaining attractivic ex ante. Es
anre pricing, as in the posted-pricc market,
docs not suH-er from this drawback; but,
whcn the price is fixed e.t- arrte, the lock-in
ctícct may havc a ncgative impact on thc
scllcr's incentivc lo producc high quality.
The relative imporlance of thcse consiclera-
tions dcpends on the parameters fi and n.
l'hc fulluwing scction will dcmunstralc that
thc trade-otí bctwccn thc twu pricing insti-
tutions can cxplain which will cmcrgc as an
cctuilibrium lrading rttlc in a givcn cnvirun-
mcnt.
IV. Thc Stability or Competilion
This section is dcvoled to analyzing which
pricing mechanism is stable against compe-
tition. A parlicular trading rule can survivc
only if no tradcr can gain by deviating and
using anothcr Irading rulc. Applying lhis
idea to the negotiated-price markcl mcans
that no scllcr should hc ablc to prolit from
posting a price e.r orue in a situation whcrc
all thc othcr scllcrs rcly on er pu.ct pricing.
l'hal is. it nwst be impussiblc to attract
profitably the demand of all cunsumen hy
undcrcutting the negotiated-price equilib-
rium p and posting p G j~. The rcason why
such an atlempt may fail is that prices he-
luw j~ may be viewed as an indication of low
quality. Using thc same restrictiuns on hc-
liefs as in Section [ll. I will assume that lhc
posted otícr p convinces the consumer of
quality yh only if p ~~rr( ji), whcrc ~rr(. ) is
defined by (6).
DeJinitior?: Thc negoliatcd-price equilib-
rium p is srahle against pricc compctition if
thcre is no p G p such that (i) p? rr( ji) and
(ii) p-c(qt,)~[p-c(qh)1rN.
VC)L. R3 A'O. I iiE.ti77:R: R~1Rl:AlNING l~7iRSl1,S 1'RI('F ('OAIPFTI"1'ION
lio)r if and n)rh~ ij a z a` and S 5 Sc-(a).
Flci~ar. 2. Nrcc,rlnir.u Peu.IN~~ Is Si'nin r iN
Rrc.u,N. II nun IV; Pusrru 1'luc.wu ls S~rnu,.r
IN RI.,'~I(,N~ I nNll Ilx
zR5
PROOF:
As j) 7 c(qr,) and N? 2, thcrc is ahvays a
p G~) satisfying (ii) in the definition of sta-
bility. As qr, -~) ? t~, condition (i) is idcnti-
cal lu p~ r!, - ~S(rrr, - n). '1'hcrcli)rc, j) is
stable if and only if therc is no p G jr satis-
fying (i). 'I'his means onc must havc j~ 5
qr - S(q~, - j)). Using j) from Proposilion 1,
this condition is eyuivalent to
a
In uthcr words, the institution of ncgoti-
ated pricing cannot be eroded by price-
posting if any otfer below j) is either vicwed
as a low-quali[y signal or fails to increase
the seller's prolit even when he scrves thc
whole market. To determinc the range of









Moreover, S~da) ~ t) fur all a e(a', ll. In
Figure 2 the function S- S~.(a) is depicted
fur a e(a~, I); it divides the former region
ll of Figure I into the regions 1l~ and II.
PROPOSITION 3: Tlrr neguliul~~~l-pricr
equilibrirun f~ is s,r,nh r,b~)i,r.~r ~)i~~ rr,),rl)e,i-
(10) S~a(qh-c(9n)~-(I-a)(Qn-qt)~
~ a(Nn - c(9i,)Í-(9r, - 9r).
As S ~ I, this inequality cannot hold if thc
Icft-hand side is negative. Accordingly, by
thc dcfinition of Sc-(a), ( 1O) holds if and
only if a )(Rn - 9r)r(r!n - c(qi,)} qh - 9~ )
- ir and S 5 Sr-(a). Note that
Sr.(a) is strictly incrcasing for a 1 á and
that Ss(a`)- Sc-(cr~). Accordingly, by
Proposition 1 there is no negotiated-price
equilibrium p for a e ( á, a~` ) and fi ~ Sc-(a).
"1'his means that condition ( IO) applics if
and only if a? a` and fi 5 fic.(a).
Pmposition 3 statcs that ncgotiated pric-
ing cannot bc sustained as a Nash cquilib-
rium in thc firms' choicc of pricing policics
for paramctcr cunstcllations in rcgions I
and II' of [~igurc 2. Ncgotiatcd pricing con-
stitutes a stable equilibrium only in regions
II and 1V. At first sight it may appcar
paradoxical that for S G Sc(1) the scllcrs
will rely on price bargaining when the
buycr's bargaining power is rathcr high. This
is so, however, because competition forces
scllers to adopt a trading rulc that is advan-
tageous for the buyer.
Interestingly, notice that a stable negoti-
ated price market necessitatcs a certain
amount of markct frictions. As Srdl)GI,
hargaining is not a stablc pricing institution
when S is cluse to unily. Negotialed pricing
is unlikely to survive in a highly competitive,
almost frictionlcss cnvironmcnt. ' I'he cmpir-
ical implicntion is that hargaining tcncls to
be replaced by posted pricing when im-
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provements in the communication and
transportation technology reduce the buyer's
scarch cost. Swilching costs in combinalion
with impcrfect quality information prrnidc a
role for negotiated pricing in regions II and
IV. l'his may explain wliy thcre is relatively
líttle haggling in markets whcre the cun-
sumer is well informed about product qual-
ity as, for example, in thc market for nlass-
produced brand goods. Also, bargaining is
observed less frequently in the market for
new automobiles than in the used-car mar-
ket, where quality uncertainty is more im-
portant. Other examples for negotiated
pricing are the markets for antiques and
real estate, where the buyer has to inspect
quality before making a purchase.
To complete the analysis, I now investi-
gate the stability of posted pricing. 1 assume
that posting p` legally commits the seller
only in the sense that he cannot ask his
customers to pay more than p`. However,
this does not constrain the parties not lo
revise jointly the terms of the transaction. If
in the course of bargaining they hoth reach
an agreement, then this replaces the posted
price. Accordingly, [he buyer accepts lhe
seller's posted offer p' only if he does not
see a chance to pay less after bargaining.
Defenition: The posted-price equilibrium p'
is stable against hargaining if, given d-
d(p` ), it is the case that cp( qn, d)? p".
Given that the buyer cannot induce a price
reduction by bargaining, he has to pay p'
after switching to another store. Therefore,
his threat point in a stable posted-price
equilibrium is d(p' ), as defined by (3).
PROPOSITION 4: The posred-price equilib-
rium p' is stable against bargaining ij and
a~ly if either a 5 a' or a~ a` artd S z
Sc(a ).
PROOF:
Using ( 5), p' is stable if and only if
p~ 5(I - ax9n - d(P`)) f ac(9n). As
d(p' )- S(qn - p' ), this is equivalen[ to
(ll) p'S[(l-a)(1-S)qn
-Fac(9n)[,[1-(I-a)S].
By Proposition 2 this condition always holds
if ó?[q~ - c(qn))r[qn - c(qn)] because
then p~-c(qn). For Se(5~;,[qi -c(qn)]~
[qn - c(qn))), onc has p` -(qt - Sqn)~
( I- S), so lhat ( 1 I) is identical tu
(l2) S[a(Cln-c(qn))-(I-a)(9n-4~)~
~ a(qn - c(~7n))-~~In - q~).
As 0 G S c 1, (12) always holds if the left-
hand side is negative, that is, if
a 5[qn - 4~],[qn -c(9n) t qn -9r~ -á.
For a 1 á, (12) is equivalent to S ~ Sc(a).
By Proposition 2, p' exists if and only if
S~ Sy. As Su ~ Sc(a) for a E(ir,a'), any
pY is stable if a 5 a~. For a E[a', 1), one
has S„ 5 Sc.(a) c [q~ - c(qn)]r[qn - c(qn)),
so that over this range (I I) holds if and only
if S ? Sc.(a).
Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrate that,
whenever the N sellers are active in the
market, a unique stable pricing institution
emerges. As the stahility crilerion elimi-
nates posted pricing in region II of Figure 2,
our model predicts that Bertrand competi-
tion will prevail in regions I and II~ and
negotiated pricing will prevail in regions II
and IV. Using Propositions 1 and 2, it is
easily established that p' ~ p in region II'
whereas p c p' in region IÍ. The endoge-
nous determination of trading rules thus
maximizes the consumer's equilihrium util-
ity. ]n region ll' the sellers are trapped in a
prisoner's dilemma type of situatíon. They
all end up with lower profits because the
negotiated price p makes undercutting
profitable. In contrast, in region Il the sig-
naling effect associated with posted pricing
results in a price level p' that makes bar-
gaining more efticient for coping with the
moral-hazard problem.
V. Conclusion
[ have explored how difTerent pricing
mechanisms affect the determination of
quality and price in a markct with quality
uncertainty and switching costs. In sum-
I r)t.. .Cr n(t t rrF.c77-tt: H.urc,tf.vthc: I F.rr.cU.1I'RIr'li fY)M1!1'h77"flr)N ?w~
m;fry, pustcd pricing imv,lvcs nwral hazard,
whcrcas ncgc~tiatcd pricing is nut vcry cc,m-
pctitivc. 1 havc shown that in nty nunlcl this
lraclc-ulf hclwccn Ihc Iwu lracling inslitu-
ticros uniyucly dctcrmincs thc cquilihrium
pricing pl,liry. ~('hc cyuilihrium tracling
mcchanism has thc intcresling propcrty tII:It
it cnsures thc cc,nsumcr thc highcsl pussihlc
ulilily Icvcl.
Mv muclcl sU'csses lhc rulc I,f quality
unccrlainly for the dctcrmination ul
pricing rulcs. Of coursc, this Icavcs out a
numhcr of other considcratiuns that may bc
impl,rtant. For inslancc, I h:IVC :fssumcd
that bargaining proceeds undcr symmctric
infurmation su that ncgotiations arc cosl-
less. Asvmmctric-infurmatian bargaining
modcls can gcncratc c:osts in thc lorm of
dclay in :tgrecment." This may favor posted
pricing. In gcncral. howcvcr, it is not clear a
priuri which is thc most c(licicnl pricing
inslitution whcn infurmation and inccntivc
pruhlcros arc invc,lvccl.
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